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By Odil Ruzaliev
 
While the conduct of elections is viewed generally as a hallmark of democratic 
development, elections alone do not a democracy make.  In some recent instances, 
citizens of post-Soviet states have protested their leaders’ attempts to prejudice or 
falsify election results, precipitating “revolutionary” democratic change, as in Georgia 
and Ukraine.  Other former Soviet states continue to use an electoral veneer to maintain 
their regimes in power.  Uzbekistan’s elections in December 2004 were overshadowed 
by Ukraine’s orange revolution, but the Uzbek state remains a potential Central Asian 
powerhouse.  Its approach to elections and a democratic process, as well as its attitude 
concerning Ukrainian and Georgian events, are crucial to both short and long term 
developments across Eurasia.
 
This was the assessment of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), which found that once again, just as five years ago, parliamentary elections in 
Uzbekistan left the voters deprived of “genuine choice.” In the run-up to the 1999 
elections, the number of pro-government parties mushroomed. “Fidokorlar,” the 
National-Democratic party, was registered just a few months before the elections and 
nominated President Islam Karimov as its candidate in the January 2000 presidential 
election. A few months later, “Fidokorlar” merged with the pro-government party, “Vatan 
Taraqqiyoti.”
 
Five years later the same scenario played out: The new Liberal-Democratic Party of 
Uzbekistan (UzLiDeP), created in 2003, increased further the number of parties loyal to 
the president in the new Parliament. The party was registered a year before the 2004 
elections and, according to some experts, will be President Karimov’s new party. A party 
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of bankers and businessmen, UzLiDeP (1), was created to give the appearance of 
democratic change and divert critics’ attention from the opposition parties, which once 
again, were barred from taking part in the elections. Well-known organizations with long 
standing, such as “Birlik” and “Erk,” have been denied registration repeatedly by the 
Ministry of Justice, as have newer opposition groups. Persistence on the part of the 
opposition has forced the ministry to invent ever more creative excuses for denying 
registration; new regulations require candidates to have resided in Uzbekistan for the 
five years immediately preceding the elections, thus excluding the most prominent 
members of the opposition who were exiled or forced from Uzbekistan under pressure 
from, and in some cases, persecution by the current authorities. President Karimov 
claims that these opposition figures have no support within the country, but is unwilling 
to have his assertion tested in freely-contested elections.
 
What have the December parliamentary elections created? This third parliament since 
Uzbekistan’s independence from the Soviet Union has become bicameral. Uzbek 
officials seem to believe that changing the structure of the parliament would be an 
effective means of demonstrating their commitment to democracy, more effective 
perhaps than correcting their practice of democracy. The new bicameral parliament will 
consist of 220 lawmakers – 120 in the lower house, or Legislative Chamber, and 100 in 
the upper house or Senate. Lawmakers in the lower house are elected through a 
popular vote, whereas the law prescribes vague rules for elections/appointment to the 
Senate: each of the twelve provinces, the Republic of Karakalpakstan and the capital 
city, Tashkent, will send six delegates to the new parliament and another sixteen 
senators are to be nominated by the president. The parliament is meant to become a 
professional institution where lawmakers will work full-time instead of combining their 
attention to parliamentary affairs with outside primary employment. The current 
Uzbekistani leadership claims that it is trying to adopt the Western model of 
parliamentarism; the new parliament however, will represent the same groups that were 
served in the former system, those loyal to the Karimov regime. In addition to the 
sixteen senators selected by the president, Karimov’s regime certainly will have 
significant influence in the choice of candidates in each region. The chairman of the 
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senate also is “elected” at the recommendation of the president. Key cabinet positions, 
like the general-procurator, Central Bank chairman and chief of the National Security 
Service (former KGB) are nominated by the president for senate approval, rather than 
facing the popularly elected Legislative Chamber for confirmation.
 
Several groups of observers monitored the December elections in Uzbekistan. Two of 
them neutralized each other: the 21-person OSCE Limited Election Observation Mission 
and the predominantly Russian 78-person CIS Election Observation Mission. Some 
analysts posit that the CIS electoral mission was created by CIS leaders primarily to 
countermand the criticism from international observers of elections throughout the CIS, 
and to mute international reaction to elections. Of the 18 elections held in the CIS, and 
observed by this mission since its creation in 2002, none (except for the second round 
of the presidential elections in Ukraine) have been declared undemocratic, fraudulent, 
or unfair, including the rather dubious referendum in Belarus. In several instances, 
observers from the OSCE and the E.U. disagreed strongly with the findings of the CIS 
mission. In the case of the elections in Uzbekistan, the CIS mission found them 
“legitimate, free and transparent.”
 
The OSCE, in contrast, determined that the elections “did fall significantly short of 
OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections.”
 
“Regrettably, the implementation of the election legislation by the authorities failed to 
ensure a pluralistic, competitive and transparent election,” said Ambassador Lubomir 
Kopaj, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission in an OSCE 
statement. “Fundamental principles for a meaningful democratic election process, such 
as freedom of expression, association and assembly, must be respected in future 
elections.”
 
The stark rhetorical contrast between the two observer groups, and specifically the 
Uzbek government’s attitude toward each was evident on election day; Lubomir Kopaj 
complained that his group did not receive sufficient cooperation from the Uzbekcentral 
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election commission, whereas the head of the CIS Election Observation Mission, (and 
Russia’s former interior minister) Vladimir Rushailo, said that he was pleased with the 
election process and with the cooperation he got from the central election commission.
 
Reports from the November 2004 presidential elections in the United States, that 
claimed OSCE observers were denied access to some polling stations (apparently due 
to local regulations), were used against the OSCE: “We’ve been shown a ågood 
example’ by the country that advances its democratic principles in Central Asia through 
the OSCE,” President Karimov claimed sarcastically.
 
“We used to look at Europe every time we held elections and we were criticized for not 
having the type of democracy Europeans are used to. But this time we were smarter 
and invited observers from Asia as well. The OSCE cannot be an exclusive arbiter in 
this regard. It represents Europe while we are in Central Asia.’’
 
In 1999, the OSCE sent a limited number of monitors, but no observers. The United 
States government did not send its own observers but merely predicted that the 
elections would be “neither free nor fair.” Head of the then-OSCE mission in Uzbekistan, 
Madeleine Wilkens, claimed that local and regional government officials used their 
influence to promote certain candidates, forcing some 228 candidates to drop out of the 
race the week before the elections. Even though the Uzbek authorities hasten to point 
out that several countries sent observers for their elections, in most instances these 
observers are either Uzbek ÈmigrÈs, diplomats from friendly nations, foreign 
businessmen with special interests in Uzbekistan, or good friends of President Karimov. 
Despite the U.S. Embassy’s informal protest that no official mission was present to 
observe the 2000 presidential elections, the Uzbek government media trumpeted that 
there were indeed observers from the United States present in Uzbekistan. It was a 
group led by Boris Kandov, leader of the American-Bukharan Jews association, who 
had emigrated from Uzbekistan several years ago. Kandov was invited to observe the 
elections this time too, but he apparently was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to be 
present in Uzbekistan for these elections.
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Despite apparently successful calls from various opposition groups to boycott the 
elections, they were deemed valid nonetheless because the outgoing parliament had 
lowered the required voter turnout from 50% to 33%. The authorities’ concern over low 
voter turnout appeared justified on election day, when polling stations did not seem 
particularly busy. The Central Election Commission however, certified that voter turnout 
reached 85.1%, far more than the 33% requirement.
 
Nigora Khidoyatova, one of the leaders of the opposition Ozod Dehqonlar (Free 
Peasants) party, alleged that the turnout had been falsified. “Many polling stations that 
we visited were empty,” she said.
 
The government had plenty of reasons to fear a low turn-out. In the last few years the 
economic and political situation in Uzbekistan has worsened sharply. The European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) froze its credits to Uzbekistan; the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Theo van Boven, reported on the “systemic nature” 
of torture in Uzbekistan; and prominent journalist Ruslan Sharipov was jailed, tortured, 
and, eventually, released to seek political asylum in the United States.
 
At the same time, opposition groups have become increasingly more active. The 
opposition party Free Peasants with the exiled former minister of justice and first Uzbek 
Ambassador to the United States, Babur Malikov, as one of its leaders, has appeared 
on the political scene, although it was not allowed to register officially. Average citizens 
have begun to realize the extent of corruption in their political system, and active 
opposition groups have led minor, but public, protests in the past two years, which have 
served to spark more widespread calls for change. Some of the protests have even 
taken the form of suicide bombings, which target police officers considered to be corrupt 
and abusive.
 
Despite this relatively high activity, DavidLewis, project director in Central Asia for the 
International Crisis Group think tank, notes that it is too early to talk about a rose or 
orange revolution for Uzbekistan. “The minimum requirements for some kind of public 
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political opposition to have a chance at power [in Uzbekistan] are absent – some kind of 
independent media, a chance of semi-free elections,” Lewis noted to the Associated 
Press. His observations clearly undermine the leadership’s democratic façade.
 
His view is supported by independent Uzbek human rights activist Surat Ikramov. “Our 
people are not ready for this. Their political consciousness is not ripe yet. The 
opposition parties are too weak,” says Ikramov. “For the Ukrainian scenario to repeat in 
Uzbekistan, there has to be at least one officially registered real opposition party and 
censorship must be abolished completely. May be then will we have an Uzbek 
Yushchenko.”
 
The “political consciousness” of the people was tested during a series of interviews in 
one of the central markets of Tashkent – Chorsu – where all those questioned said they 
would go to the polls but could not name a candidate they would support. None of the 
interviewees knew the names of any of the five official political parties, let alone the 
names of the opposition groups.
 
Experts say that the authorities in Uzbekistan have learned well from the Georgian 
experience and have done everything to minimize its implications for Uzbekistan. The 
government’s refusal to allow the annual re-registration of the Open Society Institute’s 
office in Tashkent in 2004 provides one example of Uzbekistan learning its lesson from 
Georgia; President Karimov is convinced that the rose revolution was the work of U.S. 
billionaire George Soros and his Open Society Institute aimed at promoting democratic 
values throughout the world.
 
Karimov himself apparently does not believe in the possibility for a velvet revolution in 
Uzbekistan:  “If such a thing has to happen in our country, then it will be the 
government’s fault for failing to keep its citizens aware of the government’s policies and 
to meet their needs. It will not happen in Uzbekistan.”
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Karimov also seems to prefer that his regime stay closer to Russia than the United 
States, a stance hardened by the U.S. Department of State’s rejection of an aid 
package to Uzbekistan because the latter did not “mak[e] substantial and continuing 
progress in meeting its commitments, including respect for human rights, establishing a 
genuine multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections, freedom of expression, 
and the independence of the media.” The State Department’s position is viewed poorly 
in Uzbekistan now, particularly as it was only two years ago that Uzbekistan was 
praised by the U.S. for its cooperation in providing an airbase to U.S. forces for the war 
on international terrorism in neighboring Afghanistan.
 
Strengthening the inclination toward Moscow, Uzbekistan was recently offered a $1 
billion gas deal by Russia’s energy giant LUKoil, and Russia is, of course, well-known 
for overlooking the human rights abuses of its allies. The real concern in Central Asia 
may be that Russia is no longer strong enough to support its regional partners in a 
domestic political dispute. As Russian political scientist Aleksei Malashenko put it, the 
failure of Russian diplomacy and its “political technologists” to prevent the change of 
power in Georgia and Ukraine in favor of the opposition made the current Central Asian 
ruling elite worry about Russia’s capabilities should the situation in their countries 
change dramatically. Some analysts believe that Kyrgyzstan could be the first Central 
Asian country to experience a velvet revolution; its national elections took place on 
February 27, 2005 with presidential elections are slated to follow seven months later.
 
Popular sentiment in Tashkent remains skeptical about whether a non-violent resistance 
like the one in Ukraine could work in Uzbekistan. The deeper concern, even among 
politicians, is that a rose revolution might result in bloodshed.
 
“It is interesting to watch these kinds of events happen in other countries and call them 
a manifestation of democracy. But I don’t want it to happen in Uzbekistan. Imagine 
people spilling each other’s blood in a struggle for power. Who needs it? I don’t need 
that kind of democracy,” says Hurshid Dostmuhammad, the chairman of “Milliy 
Tiklanish” (National Renaissance), one of the five Uzbek pro-government political 
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parties. National Renaissance finished fourth in the December elections gaining 11 
seats (over 10%).
 
These elections and the new Parliament are essential to the Uzbek ruling elite and 
especially to President Karimov, whose second and (officially) last presidential term 
expires in 2007. He will need the new parliament to prolong his stay in power. He has at 
least two avenues available to him, either amend the Constitution to extend his 
presidency from two to three terms, or augment the powers of the position of Senate 
president and assume that post after his retirement (according to the Constitution, a 
retired president receives a lifetime seat in the Senate). He would, of course, need to 
install a weak but favorably disposed individual as president, a role often filled by an 
heir, such as a son, or, in President Karimov’s case, a daughter – Gulnara Karimova – 
who has begun her political career already, and at the time of her father’s expected 
retirement from the presidency, will have reached the constitutionally-established 
minimum age for a presidential candidate, 35.
 
However, “If this has to happen,” said a well-known female Uzbek journalist who asked 
not to be identified, “It will be Uzbekistan’s turn for a velvet revolution.”
 
End Notes
 
(1) UzLiDep won more seats in the Lower House than any other party and independents 
– 41 seats or 34.2%. It is believed that some influential members of the party will be 
nominated to the Senate in order to retain their important government posts.
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